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Abstract 
Countries in which inflation targeting has been adopted require high quality inflation 
forecasts.  The Polish National Bank adopted a variant of implicit inflation targeting and 
therefore the ability to forecast inflation is critically important to policy makers.  Since 
the domestic price formation process is still evolving, medium term inflation forecasting 
is often difficult.  Using quarterly data from 1995-2007, we estimate and evaluate three 
types of models for inflation forecasting: (1) output gap models, (2) models involving 
money, and (3) models which bring the foreign sector into the price formation process.  
We find that openness is significant in the price formation process and inflation targeting 
is associated with lower inflation.  Traditional measures of forecast accuracy indicate that 
the simple price gap version of the P* model and the money demand model perform best 
of this group for medium term forecasting. 
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1. Introduction 
 
      Inflation forecast targeting has widely been adopted as an effective monetary policy regime 
to lower and stabilize inflation
1
.  Inflation targeting monetary policy includes several elements: a 
public announcement of medium term numerical targets for inflation, the institutional 
commitment to price stability as the primary goal for monetary policy, increased transparency 
and increased accountability
2
. To ensure central bank credibility utilization of an explicit 
inflation target as a policy anchor requires accurate inflation forecasts.  Inflation forecasts take 
into consideration a wide spectrum of information related to past economic conditions and 
expected future economic developments
3
 and hence are essential for policy deliberations. 
      We examine several inflation forecasting models applied to Poland, a transition economy that 
has recently adopted inflation targeting.  Among the many specific studies that have examined 
the accuracy of alternative inflation forecast models, Stockton and Glassman (1987) and Lee 
(1999) are noteworthy.  Analyzing U.S data, Stockton and Glassman reported the forecast 
performances of three types of models: a rational expectations model with instantaneous market 
clearing, the monetarist model and a Phillips curve-NAIRU model, and concluded that the 
Phillips curve-NAIRU model performs better than the alternative inflation forecasting models.  
In a similar vein, Lee (1999) evaluated the inflation forecast performance of P* models relative 
to other competing models also for the U.S. and found that a money demand model and the 
                                                 
1
 IMF (2005). 
2
 Mishkin (1999, 2000) provides an excellent discussion. 
3
 See Batini and Haldene (1999), Svensson (1997), Giannoni and Woodford (2002), for further details. 
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Phillips curve NAIRU model provide more accurate forecasts than the P* model, especially over 
longer horizons.   Here we build upon the empirical literature and examine models which include 
the foreign sector in domestic price formation process.  For Poland, we employ quarterly data 
from 1995-2007 to estimate and evaluate three types of models:  1) models based upon “gaps,” 
the basic price gap version of the P* model, the explicit version of P*, and a Phillips curve-
NAIRU model, 2) models involving money, a monetarist model and a model based upon money 
demand, and 3) models incorporating the foreign sector, one including a measure of openness 
and one a measure of exchange rate effects.  The objective is two fold: (1) to assess (via 
traditional measures of forecast accuracy)  the relative performance of popular inflation forecast 
models when applied to Poland; and (2) to compare the popular inflation forecast models with 
newer models incorporating external factors which may  influence domestic price formation. 
        Poland provides an excellent case for the analysis of inflation forecast models for three 
reasons.  First, Poland is a relatively successful transition economy; therefore results obtained 
using Polish data may illuminate the forecast performances of different groups of inflation 
models for other transition economies.  Second, as Poland adopted full fledged inflation targeting 
as a monetary policy in 1998, it would be interesting to know if the policy regime change effects 
the relative forecast accuracy of alternative inflation models.   Third, Poland’s relative openness 
and desire to enter the euro zone suggests that knowledge of whether openness effects domestic 
price formation would be useful for policymakers. 
      The next section briefly describes monetary policy regimes employed by the National Bank 
of Poland (NBP) from the early 1990’s to present.  Section 3 elaborates several forecasting 
models to be evaluated and empirical results are discussed in Section 4.  Section 5 presents the 
forecast results and section 6 summarizes and concludes.  The appendix provides information on 
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data sources.  The results suggest that in terms of forecast accuracy the basic price gap version of 
the P* model and the money demand model are preferred, but the models including foreign 
sector information also add significant information to the price formation process. 
 
2. Monetary regimes in Poland (1990-2005) 
      Monetary policy of Poland in the 1990s evolved through three rather distinct regimes.  In 
1990, the collapse of the centrally planned economy brought about a hyperinflation.  The NBP 
adopted a fixed exchange rate regime to provide a highly visible nominal anchor.  This initial 
phase of stabilization lasted roughly from 1990 to 1994 bringing an economic recovery and 
lowering inflation from 249.3% in 1990 to 29.5% by 1994.  
      The initial success in stabilizing the economy coupled with rigidities of the fixed exchange 
rate policy led to a more eclectic policy by 1995.  The strategy focused on multiple objectives.  It 
attempted to meet inflation goals and maintain financial stability, but also focused on the current 
account balance.  In order to achieve the objectives, NBP attempted to employ different 
instruments for different objectives.  Exchange rate policy was directed to prevent worsening of 
the current account.  Short term interest rates were used to limit demand pressure and influence 
the yield curve.  On occasion, a monetary aggregate, M2, was targeted.  When these instruments 
appeared to be ineffective in curbing inflation other instruments, like reserve requirements on 
commercial bank deposits were increased.  In 1997 Parliament approved legislation for greater 
independence of the National Bank of Poland and a ten member monetary policy committee was 
created.  This decision facilitated the implementation of full fledged monetary targeting. 
(Christoffersen et al, 2001). 
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      This ‘eclectic approach’ to monetary policy during the late 1990s resulted in lowering the 
high level of inflation, 21.6 % in 1995, to 13% by the second quarter of 1998.  Several important 
structural changes were undertaken as well.  Current and capital accounts were liberalized the 
banking sector was essentially privatized and continued to develop as an effective legal and 
institutional framework for a sound banking system was created.  Such structural changes then 
allowed the NBP to introduce a more focused monetary policy.    Though Poland experienced a 
steady decline in inflation in this period, the rate of disinflation was slow compared to some 
other transition countries
4
.  In addition, despite the managed float the current account balance 
steadily deteriorated.  The ‘eclectic’ monetary policy, with a multiplicity of objectives and 
multiple instruments, often led to ineffective communications with the markets and lessened the 
accountability of the NBK.    As a result, the newly established monetary policy council decided 
to implement full fledged inflation targeting in September 1998.  The Council adopted a short 
term (one year) and medium term (3 year) inflation goal, to reduce inflation to less than 4% by 
2003, which was indeed achieved.  The Council also decided to focus on the consumer price 
index (CPI) rather than the “core inflation index”, because the CPI was the most common and 
understandable measure of the price level in the mind of the public.   
      A floating exchange rate regime was introduced in April 2000 re-focusing the NBPs 
commitment to a single objective: attaining price stability via inflation targeting.  Since then the 
central bank intervened in the foreign exchange market mainly to ensure the stability required as 
a criteria for convergence towards the euro zone.  In addition, the NBP began regular publication 
of quarterly inflation reports that further enhanced the accountability and transparency of their 
policy strategy.  As Figure 1 indicates, the policy was successful in bringing down inflation as 
CPI growth fell from roughly 14% in 1998 to 0.7% in 2003.  
                                                 
4
 Czech Repulic, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovak Republic 
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                                       Figure 1:  CPI and Net Inflation 1998-2003 
       
        Source:   http://www.nbp.pl/en/publikacje/o_polityce_pienieznej/strategy_beyond_2003.pdf 
 
      The framework for monetary strategy beyond 2003 is based on objectives associated with 
joining the European Union (Poland joined the European Union on May 2004), the completion 
of the disinflation process and the approaching membership in the Euro zone.  The monetary 
policy council targeted an inflation rate of 2.5% ±1% for 2003 and thereafter, which was also 
achieved.  Currently inflation meets Maastricht inflation criteria.  However for the smooth 
transition to the Euro zone the NBP must relax its strict direct inflation targeting strategy  of 
monetary policy (inflation targeting is the sole objective) and devise a new strategy to provide a 
more congenial framework for monetary convergence.  Since the Maastricht criteria also require 
exchange rate stability along with the low inflation rate, it is likely that greater weight must be 
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assigned to exchange rate stability.  This suggests models of inflation that reflect international 
conditions may be useful.   
 
 
3. Model specifications 
      Because the economic structure for the typical transition economy has been unstable it is 
unclear how best to model the inflationary process.  Thus, at this point our analysis is partly 
exploratory in nature.  In this section we briefly describe seven models from the literature.  The 
first two sets of models focus on domestic sources of inflationary pressures, either the output gap 
or money; while the third set of models add external factors which may influence price behavior.  
 
3.1. The Basic P* Model  
      Hallman, et al. (1989, 1991) developed a model for forecasting inflation in the US based on 
the quantity theory of money, the P* model.  It is simply derived from the equation of exchange: 
tttt VMYP = , where Pt is the price level during period t, Yt is real output, Mt is the  amount of 
money in circulation during the period and Vt is the velocity of money.  Letting **, tt YV  be the 
equilibrium levels of Vt and Yt, then in equilibrium the equation of exchange may be written as: 
*** tttt VMYP = . 
Taking logarithms and subtracting the actual from the equilibrium equation gives  
                                  )()(pp
**
t
*
t tttt yyvv −+−=−                                            (1) 
where small letters indicate logarithms of the variables.  The price gap, the difference between 
actual inflation and long run expected inflation is a function of the velocity gap and the real 
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output gap respectively.  The long run potential price, output and velocity of money are 
estimated via the Hodrick-Prescott filter.  
The basic inflation forecasting model is then specified as an error correction model: 
 ∆pt = α0 + ∑
=
4
1j
(α1j∆pt-i) + α2(pt-1
*
 - pt-1)          (basic price gap model)                  (2)    
where ∆ is the difference operator.  Here the general price level will tend to rise if its lagged 
value is below 1* −tp , and fall if it is above 1* −tp .  Lags up to four periods capture inertia and 
seasonal patterns.   
Substituting the expression for the price gap from equation (1) gives the explicit version of the 
P* model: 
  ∆pt = γ0 + ∑
=
4
1j
(γ 1j∆pt-i) + γ 2(vt-1
*
 - vt-1) + γ 3(yt-1 – y*t-1)      (explicit price gap model)       (3)  
Here inflation adjusts simultaneously to disequilibrium in both the goods market and the money 
market. 
 
3.2. The expectations augmented Phillips curve –NAIRU model    
      This model is derived from separate wage and price equations (Gordon, 1982).  If demand 
causes output to exceed potential output, factor input prices are bid up resulting in inflationary 
pressure.  On the contrary, if actual output is below potential output, there are  
disinflationary pressures.  The reduced form version of this model specifies inflation as a 
function of its lagged values, a real output gap and current nominal income growth.   
With all variables as defined above, the forecasting equation is  
   ∆pt = δ0 + ∑
=
4
1j
 (δ 1j∆pt-i) +δ 2(yt-1 - yt-1
*
) + δ 3(∆yt-1
′
 - ∆yt-1
*
)       (PC-NAIRU model) (4) 
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3.3. Traditional monetarist model 
      The traditional monetarist model specifies the past growth rate in the money supply as the 
main determinant of long run aggregate inflation (Carlson (1980), Hafer (1983)).  Inflation is 
therefore a function of current and past measures of money growth.  The inflation forecasting 
model is specified as: 
              ∆pt = β0 + ∑
=
4
1j
[(β 1j∆pt-i) + (β 2∆mt-i)]                  (monetarist model)           (5) 
Again, lagged inflation captures inertia and ∆mt-i   is lagged money growth.  Empirical estimates 
from the monetarist model vary with the choice of monetary aggregates.  Mehra (1988), Stockton 
and Glassman (1987) and Reichenstein and Elliot (1987) suggest that the forecasting 
performance of this model is poor regardless of the choice of monetary aggregate.   
 
3.4. The money demand model 
      Here we adopt a model based on Reichenstein and Elliott (1987) and Tallman (1995).  The   
forecasting equation includes a monetary aggregate and the interest rate, the opportunity cost of 
money.  The intuition underlying the forecasting equation is that if money supply growth is the 
same as the rate of growth of money demand (captured by interest rate and output fluctuations) 
inflation will remain stable.  If money growth exceeds the growth in money demand, then the 
excess money growth results in inflation. 
The forecasting equation is: 
∆pt = ø 0 + ∑
=
4
1j
(ø 1j.∆pt-i) + ∑
=
4
1j
(ø 2j. ∆mt-i) + ø 3. ∆yt-i + ø 4. ∆rt-1     (money demand model)  (6) 
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Lagged inflation is added again to capture inertia and seasonality and r is an appropriate interest 
rate (here money market rate).  
 
3.5. An augmented Phillips curve model with trade openness 
      Allard (2007) constructed an augmented Phillips curve and incorporated ‘trade openness’ to 
determine if globalization affects the relationship between output and inflation.  Trade openness 
(T) is defined as the ratio of imports to GDP.  Allard’s specification is 
∆pt = α ∆pt-1 + β (1 +γ T t-1) (yt-1 - yt-1
*
) + itε                      (trade-openness model)       (7) 
This specification allows globalization, defined narrowly as trade openness, to influence the 
trade off between inflation and domestic economic conditions.  
 
3.6. Models with exchange rate pass through 
      Edwards (2006) examines exchange rate pass through in the context of inflation targeting and 
investigates the relationship between exchange rate changes and inflation for a panel of 
countries, some of which had adopted inflation targeting.  The model he examines is specified 
as: 
 ∆pt = 0γ +α ∑
=
4
1j
∆pt-1 + 1β ∆ e t + 2β p* + 3β (∆ e t *dit) + 4β ∑
=
4
1j
(∆pt-1
f
dit)                           (8) 
Where DIT is a dummy variable that takes the value of one at the time IT is adopted, and zero 
otherwise, p is the log of the CPI, e is the log of the exchange rate and p
f
 is the log of an index of 
foreign prices.  
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4. Empirical results 
       Each of the inflation models is estimated with quarterly data from 1995q1 to 2007q4.   First 
we performed the Phillips-Perron unit root test on the key variables.  As shown in Table 1, for all 
variables except the price gap the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 1% and 5% 
level, indicating stationarity for those variables.  For the price gap, a unit root is rejected at the 
5% level. 
                                 
                     Table 1: (Unit root test) Phillips -Perron Statistics (1995Q1-2007Q4) 
 
                              With trend                                                            Without trend 
 
dcpi                           -3.41 *                                                                   -5.06 **                                                                                                                             
 
p-gap                        -2.96 *                                                                   -2.93* 
 
v-gap                         -6.64**                                                                  -6.54 **         
                            
rgdp-gap                   -11.81 **                                                               -12.25** 
 
dm2                           -5.06**                                                                  -7.59**                                                         
 
dmmr                          -5.07**                                                                 -5.04** 
 
_______    
** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% and * indicates rejection at the 5% level.                        
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               Table 2: Estimates of Inflation Forecast Models (p-values in parentheses) 
 
 1 
Basic gap 
model  
n=47 after 
adj. 
2 
Explicit gaps 
model 
n=47 after adj. 
3 
 Phillips curve 
Nairu model 
n=47 after adj. 
4 
Traditional 
monetarist 
model 
n=47 after adj. 
5 
Demand for real 
money balances  
n=47 after adj. 
6 
Trade 
Openness 
n=47 after 
adj. 
      7 
Exchange  
Rate pass  
  through  
n=47 after adj. 
Intercept 
 
0.0013 
(0.6318) 
0.0043 
(0.1894) 
0.0044 
(0.1687) 
0.0009 
(0.8952) 
0.0020 
(0.5146) 
-0.0006 
(0.8374) 
  -0.0024 
  (0.4931) 
∆pt-1 
 
0.4764 
(0.0055) 
0.3862 
(0.0515) 
0.3853 
(0.0505) 
0.4167 
(0.0512) 
0.2245 
(0.2436) 
0.3260 
(0.0055) 
   0.2439 
   (0.0853) 
∆pt-2 
 
    -0.2436 
    
(0.1361) 
-0.2482 
        (0.2432) 
-0.2482 
       (0.2499) 
-0.2152 
      (0.3078) 
-0.0877 
(0.6584) 
     0.0119 
   (0.9387) 
∆pt-3 
 
0.2346 
(0.1066) 
0.1682 
(0.3717) 
0.2012 
(0.2921) 
0.0835 
(0.6595) 
0.1524 
(0.4620) 
     0.1455 
   (0.2638) 
∆pt-4 
 
0.3897 
(0.0040) 
0.4083 
(0.0103) 
0.3671 
(0.0233) 
0.3551 
(0.0407) 
0.4253 
(0.0081) 
0.5111 
(0.0000) 
    0.5354 
   (0.0001) 
pt-1
*
 - pt-1 
 
0.3105 
(0.0019) 
      
vt-1
*
 - vt-1 
 
 0.0284 
(0.5940) 
     
yt-1
*
 - yt-1 
 
 0.0531 
(0.3798) 
0.0662 
(0.2797) 
  0.2923 
( 0.0714) 
 
∆yt-1
′
 - ∆yt-1
*
   -0.0290 
(0.4252) 
    
∆mt-1 
 
   0.1364 
(0.1028) 
0.1489 
(0. 0560) 
  
∆mt-2 
 
   0.0154 
(0.8634) 
0.0510 
(0.5165) 
  
∆mt-3 
 
   -0.1053 
(0.1894) 
-0.1083 
(0.1375) 
  
∆mt-4 
 
   0.0638 
(0.4520) 
0.1246 
(0.1182) 
  
∆yt-1     0.0219 
(0.4461) 
  
∆rt-1     0.0025 
(0.0091) 
  
(yt-1
*
 - yt-1)*Tt-1 
 
     -0.5512 
(0.1005) 
 
∆ et  
          0.2604 
   (0.0541) 
∆ et*DIT          -0.2401 
   (0.0993) 
∆pt*            0.2536 
    (0.5390) 
Adj. R
2 
0.7766 0.6856 0.6896 0.6988 0.7721 0.7047     0.6981 
F (p-value) 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000     0.000 
DW 1.76 1.75 1.72 1.72 1.88 1.66      1.33 
LM test statistic 1.63 
(0.21) 
2.33 
(0.11) 
2.29 
(0.12) 
2.13 
(0.14) 
0.227 
(0.79) 
1.16 
(0.32) 
    0.475 
    (0.62) 
AIC -6.77 -6.41 -6.43 -6.42 -6.68 -6.59     -6.51 
BIC -6.34 -5.94 -5.96 -5.82 -6.04 -6.38     -6.16 
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      The regression results are summarized in Table 2. In each specification the adjusted R
2
 is 
reasonably high.  For the basic price gap model (Specification 1) most of the individual 
coefficient estimates are significant. The Durbin Watson statistic (DW) is 1.76 >DU (39, 6) and we 
do not reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. The LM test for higher order serial 
correlation does not reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation as well.  In the money 
demand model (Specification 5) the adjusted R
2
 is again relatively high and inflation lagged four 
periods, money lagged one period and interest rates lagged one period are statistically 
significant. The LM test for serial correlation indicates no higher order serial correlation. In the 
explicit gap model (Specification 2), the Phillips Curve – NAIRU model (Specification 3), and 
the traditional monetarist model (Specification 4) the coefficient estimates of critical variables 
are not statistically significant.   
      The augmented Phillips curve model with trade openness (Specification 6) and the exchange 
rate pass through model (Specification 7) have reasonably high adjusted R2.   In specification 6 
the estimated coefficient that measures the effect of globalization (  (yt-1
*
 - yt-1)*Tt-1 ) is statistically 
significant and negative confirming the results of Allard (2007). Also the LM test for higher 
order serial correlation indicates there is none.  For the model with exchange rate pass through 
the estimated coefficient for e∆  (an increase is a nominal depreciation) has a positive sign and is 
statistically significant.  The estimated coefficient of (∆ et*DIT) is negative and statistically 
significant, indicating that in Poland inflation has significantly declined in the post-IT period.  
Further, the LM test for serial correlation implies the absence of serial correlation.  These two 
models clearly indicate that the openness of the Polish economy plays an important role in the 
domestic inflation process. Further, inflation targeting has made a significant impact on domestic 
inflation.              
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5. Forecast results: 
      We examine the in-sample forecast performance using three criteria: root mean square error 
(RMSE), mean absolute error (MAE) and the Theil inequality coefficient (TIC). The first two 
statistics are scale dependent (upon the endogenous variable) while TIC is scale invariant.  All 
three have a range of zero to one with zero indicating a perfect fit.  As judged by both RMSE and 
MAE and the TIC the best in-sample forecast performance is obtained with the price gap version 
of the P* model. 
    
5.1. In-sample forecasts 
      We construct a dynamic forecast for the period 1995Q1:2005Q4 using the estimated 
specifications.  Dynamic forecasts calculate multi-step forecasts starting from the first period 
(1995Q1) of the forecast sample.  In addition we compared the in sample forecast results with a 
benchmark random walk model.  The ratio of RMSE of each model to that of the random walk 
model is presented in Table 3 which summarizes the results for all models. 
 
                                     Table3:  Summary of measures of in- sample forecast accuracy 
                                    Model 1    Model 2          Model 3          Model 4       Model 5   Model 6    Model 7                                    
 
                  RMSE         0.0055*     0.0076            0.0074          0.0073         0.0062     0.0075        0.0072 
 
                   MAE          0.0042*     0.0058            0.0056          0.0054         0.0048     0.0054        0.0054 
 
                 RMSE          0.3777      0.4222              0.4111         0.4051         0.3666     0.4166        0.4000           
               RMSERW  
                   
                  TIC               0.1371 *      0.2044             0.1994         0.1919         0.1641       0.2013      0.1964  
    
 * indicates the lowest values for the particular criterion. 
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From these results we conclude that Specification 1, the basic price gap version of the p* 
model, the very simplest model, performs best of this group in terms of in-sample forecast 
accuracy.            
 The in-sample forecasts are presented in Figures 2-8.  The solid line is the actual inflation 
rate while the dashed line is the forecasted inflation rate. 
  
           
Figures 2-8:  In-sample forecasts 
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            Model 2: Explicit Gap version of the P* Model 
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              Model 4: Monetarist Model 
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   Model 6: Augmented Phillips curve model with trade openness 
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             Model 7: Model with Exchange Rate pass through 
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5.2. Out of Sample forecasts 
      Now let us consider out of sample forecasts for the four best models in terms  
of in-sample forecast accuracy namely, for the basic price gap P* model, the monetarist                      
model, the money demand model and the inflation model with exchange rate pass through. 
The out of sample forecasting procedure requires forecasted values of exogenous variables, 
which are slightly different for each model.  For the price gap model we construct the out of 
sample values for the price gap.  For the monetarist model and the money demand model we 
construct the out of sample values for money growth, the interest rate and growth in real GDP.  
Likewise for the model with exchange rate pass through we constructed future values of the 
exchange rate and extended the values for the dummy variable, DIT, up to 2010q4. We assume 
that the log of exogenous variables across the models roughly follows a linear trend with 
deviations from that trend in a cyclical pattern.  The cyclical component is determined by a 
simple model in which we regress the exogenous variable against a constant and a time trend, 
with an AR (4) error  
      The out of sample forecast graphs are presented in Figures 9-12.  The solid line represents 
the actual rate of inflation and the dashed line the forecasted rate of inflation. Model 1, the basic 
price gap model forecasts inflation around 1% and rising slightly while the other models forecast 
inflation to be fluctuating just under 1%. Of course, deviations from the assumed paths for the 
exogenous variables would alter these forecasts, and many alternative scenarios could be 
constructed. 
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Figures 9-12. 
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              Model 5: Money Demand Model 
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6. Conclusions 
      We evaluate the forecast performance of alternative inflation models.   Several important 
features of price formation in Poland are revealed.  First, rapid adjustment of inflation rates to the 
change in money growth does not generally appear to occur.  Instead, the money demand model 
indicates that interest rates and output movements do impact inflation.  For forecasting purposes 
the simple, most parsimonious model, the price gap version of the P* model and the money 
demand model provide the best forecasts.  Because inflation was more volatile in the early part 
of the sample, the models likely would improve as more data become available allowing the 
earlier observations to be dropped.  Further, it appears that the relative openness of the economy 
is important.  Foreign shocks, either through trade flows or exchange rate pass through, do matter 
in determining domestic inflation.  Policy makers should be keenly aware of the role of the 
foreign sector in domestic price determination as full integration into the Euro zone proceeds. 
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                                                 Appendix:  Data Sources 
 
Data are from International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF.  The following variables are 
employed.   
 
M2:  M2 comprises M1 and time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of the private sector, 
public non financial enterprises, and non bank financial institutions with the Bank of Poland and 
commercial banks. 
Source: IFS CD-ROM 
 
Interest Rates: 
Money market rate: Weighted average rate on outstanding one-month deposits in the inter bank 
market.  Beginning January 1992, weighted average rate on outstanding deposits of one month or 
less in the inter bank market. 
Treasury bill rate: Weighted average yield on 13-week Treasury bills sold at auctions. 
Source: IFS CD-ROM 
 
Consumer Price Index: The index covers 1800 goods and services from 307 districts. Since 1990, 
the weight system has been based on a household budget survey. The weights are revised every 
year. 
Source: IFS CD-ROM 
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National Accounts: 
Real GDP: Beginning in 1990, data are sourced from the Eurostat database. Eurostat introduced 
chain-linked GDP volume measures to both annual and quarterly data. 
Chain-linked GDP volume measures are expressed in the prices of the previous year and re-
referenced to 1995. 
Source: IFS CD-ROM 
 
Trade openness: defined as the ratio of the imports to GDP. The value for GDP and imports are 
taken from IFS CD database. 
Source: IFS CD-ROM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
